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r HE Concept of Law is the most important book in twentieth-cen-
tury analytic jurisprudence.' Its importance is a function of many
- things, not the least of which is the fact that Hart's approach to
jurisprudence was forged at a time of great intellectual ferment in ana-
lytic philosophy.2 The Concept of Law was written during a period when
analytic philosophy's commitment to language as the focal point of philo-
sophical reflection had been firmly cemented. 3 At the time he wrote The
Concept of Law, Hart was in a unique position to take advantage of then-
recent work in philosophy of language. Yet, when the book was pub-
lished, no one could foresee just how sharp the linguistic turn in philoso-
phy would be. I would suspect that even Hart, prescient as he was, could
not have predicted the depth and breadth in the expansion of language as
the central focus of philosophical activity.
Like any great work, there is much in The Concept of Law that de-
mands attention and explication. Before I introduce the topic on which I
will focus, I would like to say a few things about how I see the book.
First, it is properly located in the tradition of analytic jurisprudence
known as positivism. Central to positivism is the idea that the true
ground of legal obligation-the source of validity for what is referred to
as "law"-is an origin. This notion, central to the thought of Hobbes and
John Austin, is contemporarily expressed in Joseph Raz's felicitous
phrase, the "sources thesis." For a norm to be law, it must be the case
that it originates in an act of some official, that possesses the requisite
authority.
John Austin gave expression to this idea in the nineteenth century
when he argued that the best way to think of law was as the imperative of
a sovereign backed by threat of reprisal for non-compliance. Hart fa-
mously demolished this conception by pointing out that on Austin's pic-
ture of the nature of law, there is no material difference between "the
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University, School of Law (Camden).
B.A., J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo. My thanks to Professor Brian Bix for
very helpful comments on a draft of this Article.
1. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
2. An excellent discussion of the intellectual history of the period is found in P.M.S.
HACKER, WIrTGENSTEIN'S PLACE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
(1996).
3. For an account of the rise of analytical philosophy, especially philosophy of lan-
guage, see MICHAEL DUMMETr, ORIGINS OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY (1994).
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law" and the command of a gunman to turn over one's purse.4
Paying attention to Hart's critique of Austin leads me to see The Con-
cept of Law as a book in two parts. The first part-the first six chapters-
is dedicated to two tasks. The first is the articulation and demolition of
the Austinian conception of legal obligation. From the vantage point of
the present, there can be little question that Hart's critique of Austin is
successful.
The second major theme in The Concept of Law is the advancement of
Hart's account of the nature of law: the notion that law is a matter of
rules. According to Hart, law has a nature that is best thought of in terms
of a distinction between two sorts of rules: primary and secondary. Pri-
mary rules are rules of obligation. Secondary rules are rules of change.
Taken together, these rules comprise the genetic structure of the legal
system.
But what is the (validating) source of primary and secondary rules?
What makes these rules valid? Hart says that a "master rule"-the Rule
of Recognition-is the validating source for all other secondary rules and
primary rules. Hart's discussion of the Rule of Recognition completes his
analysis of the nature of law.
We turn, then, to the second part of The Concept of Law, chapter
seven, which contains Hart's much-discussed comments on the discretion,
as well as one of the clearest examples of the influence of linguistic phi-
losophy, the distinction between core and penumbral meaning.
Does chapter seven constitute a "theory of adjudication"? I certainly
believe it does, but some dispute this. 5 Perhaps it is safe to say that if one
is ever to find a theory of adjudication in Hart's ouvre, this is the best
place to look.6 Chapter seven of The Concept of Law has been the focal
point of discussion in analytic jurisprudence since Ronald Dworkin first
called into question Hart's account of the role of discretion in deciding
4. See HART, supra note 1, at 82.
A orders B to hand over his money and threatens to shoot him if he does not
comply. According to the theory of coercive orders this situation illustrates
the notion of obligation or duty in general. Legal obligation is to be found in
this situation writ large; A must be the sovereign habitually obeyed and the
orders must be general, prescribing courses of conduct not single actions.
The plausibility of the claim that the gunman situation displays the meaning
of obligation lies in the fact that it is certainly one in which we would say that
B, if he obeyed, was 'obliged' to hand over his money.
Id.
5. See Ken Kress, Modern Jurisprudence, Postmodern Jurisprudence, and Truth, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1871, 1901 (1997) (reviewing DENNIS PATrERSON, LAW AND TRUTH
(1996)).
This aspect of law is often held to show that any elucidation of the concept of
law in terms of rules must be misleading. To insist on it in the face of the
realities of the situation is often stigmatized as 'conceptualism' or 'formal-
ism,' and it is to the estimation of this charge that we shall now turn.
Id. (citation omitted).
6. In the Postscript to THE CONCEPT OF LAW, Hart said that while he did speak to the
topic, he "said far too little ... about the topic of adjudication and legal reasoning." HART,
supra note 1, at 259.
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cases.7
Let us return to the issue of the nature of law. As I mentioned, the first
six chapters of The Concept of Law are an articulation and critique of
Austin's account of the nature of law, followed by the advancement of
Hart's alternative account of the nature of law as a system of rules. The
intellectual pedigree of this argument is important to a full understanding
of Hart's project.
Central to legal positivism is the denial of any necessary conceptual
connection between law and morality (the separation thesis). In simple
terms, the idea is that there is a logical distinction between statements of
what the law is or requires and statements about whether the law is good
or just. Put differently, nothing follows from a statement of what the law
requires: to state the law is to take no position on whether the law should
be obeyed. To state the law is neither to endorse it nor criticize it.
One of the tasks taken up by legal positivists is articulation of the
grounds of law. This enterprise is an effort to identify the "normativity"
of law.8 Bentham, Hart informs us, failed in this undertaking because he
reduced the normativity of law to social facts, specifically the acts of legis-
lative officials.9 Bentham's error, Hart maintains, is the reduction of
statements of the law to statements about the law."'
But what, exactly, is the problem of the normativity of law? For Hart,
the problem is explaining the evaluative dimension of legal language
while remaining true to the separation thesis." In The Concept of Law,
Hart explained this in terms of what he referred to as "internal points of
view"'12 toward law. In using the language of legal obligation, officials
were exhibiting a discernible attitude towards the law, one of endorse-
ment. This attitude, Hart maintains, explains the normativity of law with-
out sacrificing the separation thesis.
Hart's account of the internal point of view as the key to explaining
legal normativity was criticized 13 as insufficiently sensitive to the variety
of statements one can make when speaking of law. Internal statements
7. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-39 (1977).
8. Hart puts it this way in describing the shortcomings of the Imperative Theory of
law:
The Imperative Theory . . . fails to account for a feature of statements of
legal obligation which cannot be characterized by the aid of Bentham's con-
ceptual resources of command and habit of obedience. This feature is what is
now called the 'normativity' of such statements and statements of the law or
the legal position of individuals under the law.
H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THE-
ORY 144 (1982).
9. See id. at 144-45.
10. See id. at 144.
11. See id.
12. HART, supra note 1, at 89-90.
13. Hart cites the following from Raz: JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS
123-29, 146-48, 162-77 (1990); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND MORALITY 153-57 (1979); JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 234-38 (2d ed. 1980). Hart's citation
appears in HART, supra note 8, at 153 n.73.
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(statements of law) are normative in that they express the speaker's en-
dorsement of the rules. By contrast, moderate external statements are in
the nature of reports about what participants in a legal system believe
about their own legal standards. External statements are not comments
on the quality or character of internal statements; they are merely de-
scriptions of the beliefs of others.
In response to criticism of the distinction between committed state-
ments and reports, Hart adds a third category or dimension of normativ-
ity, the category of "'detached' judgements," which are "statements of
law or legal obligation from the point of view of one who accepts or re-
gards as valid the laws in question, but without committing the speaker to
that point of view."' 14 The distinction between Hart's original external
point of view and the newer "detached" external point of view is a matter
of the difference between description and commitment. The point of the
detached external point of view is to be able to say something true from
the point of view of law without implying a "commitment... to the truth
or validity of the claims made by committed speakers." 15 In short, Hart
now wants to differentiate use 16 of the (normative) language of a system
like law from endorsement of the system of legal rules.
Can one make a statement like "x has an obligation to y" which is true
without thereby endorsing the standard under which x's obligation falls?
In other words, is it not possible to state correctly what the law is without
thereby being committed to the view that the law correctly deals with the
issue in question? The entire point of Hart's newly-minted conception of
the external perspective is designed to do just that: to make it possible to
state the law without either endorsing it (the original internal point of
view) or merely describing it (the original external point of view).
As background for Hart's discussion, one must be mindful of the
thought of Professor Dworkin, for whom a statement of the law is not
possible without endorsing it.17 Hart wants to preserve the essential posi-
tivist point that a statement of the law carries with it no commitment to
principles that may underwrite or justify it.
Do Hart's final distinctions render any clearer our picture of the inter-
nal point of view? Neil MacCormick, one of our finest commentators on
Hart's work suspects not. MacCormick begins with the observation that
the law on any given question varies from one jurisdiction to the next. 18
14. Gerald J. Postema, The Normativity of Law, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 83 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987).
15. Id.
16. In Hart's original formulation of the normativity of law, a speaker had only two
choices: employ legal language and, thereby, endorse it (propositions of law), or merely
describe or report on the use of legal language by others (propositions about law).
17. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986). For a similar reading, see HART,
supra note 1, at 253 ("[Fjor Dworkin the truth of any proposition of law ultimately de-
pends on the truth of a moral judgment as to what best justifies and since for him moral
judgments are essentially controversial, so are all propositions of law.").
18. See Neil MacCormick, Comment, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSO-
PHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 105-13 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987).
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He provides the following example, one taken from comparative law:
Scottish testators have neither right nor power to disinherit their
children at law, and the executors of their estate are duty-bound to
secure the legal rights of the children against the estate. English and
a fortiori North Carolinan testators have such right and power and
their executors are subject to no such duty. 19
Of the variety of legal norms just described, MacCormick asks the fol-
lowing: "[I]s it possible that somebody somewhere has made a mistake
about law, legal rights, legal powers, or legal duties? ' 21 The answer is
"No." One can only agree with MacCormick's observation that "even
the most perfervid jusnaturalist, acknowledges the possibility of variance
in positive laws."'2 1 Thus, MacCormick argues, we are compelled to draw
the conclusion that legal validity is "a jurisdictionally relative concept. '22
Whether the legal rights of a child in, say, Scotland, are morally prefera-
ble to those of a child in North Carolina is a conceptually distinct matter.
As MacCormick puts it, "legal rights and obligations can vary or be va-
ried without corresponding variance in moral rights or obligations. '23
What is the issue here, and why is it important? Why should we be
clear about the relationship of legal norms to the attitudes of those who
use them to appraise the conduct of others? Part of the problem in dis-
cussing this question is getting clear about what is at stake. For Hart, the
issue is one of explanation. 24 What does it mean to explain the law? The
explanation is an explanation of the normative aspect of legal rules. This
is an explanation of the meaning of legal norms. Thus, the question of
the normativity of law is, at bottom, a question about the nature of expla-
nation of legal meaning.
Dworkin once said that jurisprudential questions are ultimately ques-
tions in the philosophy of language. 25 If we follow Dworkin here, we
would have to ask whether the meaning (normativity) of legal language
could be illuminated by recourse to the attitudes of speakers (Hart's
claim). We might want to ask to what extent the meaning of legal dis-
course turns on the attitudes of those using the terms.
The gravamen of the idea of the internal point of view is that the mean-
ing of terms is a function of something within the legal system itself. In
other words, the question whether someone is making a true or correct
statement of law is determined by resort to something within a particular
legal system.
19. Id. at 105-06.
20. Id. at 106.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 107.
23. Id. at 107-08.
24. See HART, supra note 8, at 147-48.
25. See R.M. Dworkin, Introduction, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (R.M. Dworkin
ed., 1977) ("Even the debate about the nature of law, which has dominated legal philoso-




The debate over the question of attitude toward legal statements-the
question whether a statement of the law is an endorsement of the law-is
really a question about the ultimate meaning of the terms involved. The
only reason we are interested in the statement-endorsement distinction
is because we harbor the view that some statement of the law may appear
correct but is, in fact, 26 incorrect. In short, a statement of the law may be
incorrect because the meaning of the statement involved is other than
what the speaker supposes it to be.
As we have seen, Hart tried to make sense of the distinction between
internal and external from the point of view of attitude. As the important
work of other analytically-minded legal philosophers shows,27 Hart was
on to something important with the internal-external (inside-outside) dis-
tinction. Driving Hart's analysis is the need to answer the question what,
if anything, makes legal statements unique? Put differently, the question
is what, if anything, makes a proposition "legal" and not a proposition of
some other sort (e.g., moral). 28
I want to join Neil MacCormick in his puzzlement about the merit of
Hart's final effort to express his view about the normative character of
law. MacCormick's point is that legal rights are jurisdictionally-relative.
As such, statements of the law are true only within jurisdictional bounda-
ries. Thus, legal truth, like legal rights, is (jurisdictionally) relative. The
reason MacCormick finds Hart's final effort puzzling, I suspect, is that he
does not see that Hart's final distinctions illuminate this relativity.
Where is this debate going? MacCormick claims "[clonventionalism is
all that we should need in order to account for the possibility of true
detached statements of law for a given jurisdiction at a given time."'29 I
think he is right in this, and I would like to explain why.
The core of MacCormick's criticism of Hart's final reformulation of the
internal-external distinction is the idea that the truth of a proposition of
law is jurisdictionally relative. In the language of detachment, a state-
ment of the law presupposes it to be a statement of the law in a particular
legal system at some particular time. When one says, "The law permits
disinheritance of one's children," the question naturally arises, "Where is
that type today"?
MacCormick says that "[t]o be detached in legal matters is precisely to
discover what the correct view of the law somewhere is. ' '30 He also states
that to acknowledge the correctness of a statement of the law is "to make
26. This is where the idea of "grounds of law" becomes important. The truth of a legal
proposition requires identification of the proper grounds of law.
27. See, e.g., Thomas Morawetz, Understanding Disagreement, the Root Issue of Juris-
prudence: Applying Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory, and Judging, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 371 (1992).
28. 1 take Dworkin's work to be both a critique of this view (the separation thesis) as
well as an alternative to that view. Dworkin's alternative view is that law and morality are
not separate discourses but are, in fact, joined at some deep, conceptual level (the rela-
tional thesis).
29. MacCormick, supra note 18, at 112.
30. Id. at 109.
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a cognitive commitment."'3 1 In other words, there is a fact of the matter
about (at least some) legal questions. Two questions (at least) arise: what
does it mean to say there is a fact of the matter about law and how does
this impact Hart's distinction between internal and external points of
view?
In a recent work, I argued that the best way of understanding truth in
law was in the use of forms of legal argument. 32 Very roughly, I said that
law has its own argumentative grammar, and that it is through the use of
this grammar that the truth of legal propositions is shown. An assertion
like, "In Scotland, it is legally possible to disinherit your children," can be
shown to be true or false by employing the familiar forms of legal argu-
ment. It is in the use of forms of argument that the truth of legal proposi-
tions is possible. In other words, outside these forms, there is no legal
truth.
I think Hart was right to say that acceptance is a large part of the
normativity of a legal system. But what is accepted in law is not only a
system of rules but forms of argumentative appraisal. When a lawyer
points to a statute to make the case that a particular legal assertion is
true, that text must already be regarded (accepted) as authoritative for
the gesture to be meaningful. If lawyers did not already agree in their
modes of appraisal (forms of argument), legal argument simply would not
be possible.
What does this have to do with the internal point of view and Hart's
efforts to respond to his critics? I think Hart was right when he said that
the task of jurisprudence is the description of our legal practices. He
made the hermeneutic point 33 that the key to this understanding is expli-
cating how participants in legal systems coordinate their rule-following
behavior. In short, when Hart describes his "practice theory of rules," 34
he is identifying what holds the practice together. He thought it was atti-
tude. I think it is forms of argument.
Despite this difference, I join Hart and others35 in denying any entail-
ment between legal truth and moral truth. 36 People who want the entail-
ment relationship to hold usually argue the connection from the point of
view of legal concepts. 37 They say that the meaning (and, hence, truth) of
legal assertions depends upon getting clear about the real content of the
concepts implicated by our words. In other words, the key to legal truth
31. Id.
32. See DENNIS PATFERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 169-79 (1996).
33. First observed by Peter M.S. Hacker. See P.M.S. Hacker, Hart's Philosophy of
Law, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 9 (P.M.S.
Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977) (relating the internal point of view to the claim of hermeneu-
tics that to understand human phenomena one must understand the practice or activity
from the point of view of participants).
34. HART, supra note 1, at 255.
35. See, e.g., Postema, supra note 14; MacCormick, supra note 18.
36. See MacCormick, supra note 18, at 110.
37. A recent example is Nicos STAVROPOULOS, OBJECTIVITY IN LAW (1996).
1999]
SMU LAW REVIEW
lies in uncovering the objective meaning of our concepts (legal and
otherwise).
This way of putting things confirms that attention to the philosophy of
language can engender progress in legal theory. As I have said, I think
Dworkin is correct in this.38 That said, where does this leave us with re-
spect to Hart's last effort to express the significance of the internal point
of view? It leaves me convinced that Hart was right to look for the uni-
queness of law- its normativity-in the intersubjective relations of legal
actors. More needs to be done in explicating and developing Hart's im-
portant insight.
38. But see Anne De Moor, Nothing Else to Think? On Meaning, Truth, and Objectiv-
ity in Law, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (reviewing STAVROPOULOS, supra note 37)(expressing skepticism that legal theory can benefit from advances in philosophy of
language).
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